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and the Need for Medication
Joseph R. Dunn*
I. Introduction
Derek took a seat at the table, put his hands onto the cold tabletop, and
silently stared across at his attorney. Over two years ago, he had been charged
with capital murder and now faced a possible sentence of death. But something
much more immediate was bothering him today. After he was arrested for the
murder of a Chesapeake shop-owner, the court ordered a competency evaluation
and hospitalized him after finding him incompetent to stand trial. Following a
long process of trial-and-error, during which his treating psychiatrists admin-
istered various types and amounts of antipsychotic medication, the doctors
finally found an exotic and very expensive drug which seemed to alleviate his
psychotic symptoms and Derek was returned to jail. Derek welcomed the clarity
of thought and freedom of choice that arrived with this breakthrough.'
But now he was no longer being given those exotic drugs. For reasons
incomprehensible to Derek, he had been moved temporarily to a different jail,
where the "good drugs" were not available. So, with sweat dripping down his
arms and pooling onto the tabletop, he looked across to his attorney and told
him that he needed to go back to the other jail; he was afraid of what he might
do if he slipped back into his delusional former self.
2
The attorney stared back and contemplated the legal, ethical, and moral
issues now before him. If he were to instruct his client to refuse the medication,
Derek may stay incompetent to stand trial. But was it ethical to ask his client to
* J.D. Candidate, May 2005, Washington and Lee University School of Law;B.S., California
State University, Chico, May 2002. The author would like to thank Professor Roger Groot for his
ongoing guidance and inspiration, Professor David Bruck and the students of Virginia Capital Case
Clearinghouse for their insight and collaboration, Stephen P. Givando and Barbara G. Haskins,
M.D. for their ideas and explanations, and Jessie A. Seiden for her editorial support and invaluable
friendship. The author is also grateful to his family for their continuous encouragement and advice.
Above all, the author would like to thank his wife for providing motivation, support and
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which took place during his representation of a capital defendant in early 2004. Telephone
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refuse the medication when taking it was truly in his best medical interest? His
client had a liberty interest in refusing the administration of medication, but at
what cost? Was it worth his client's temporary sanity, and, if so, for how long?
If the court ordered him to be medicated regardless, how would he be able to
show the jury the mentally ill young man who now sat across the table?
3
This article will address several important issues that may arise when a
capital defendant is in need of antipsychotics and trial is approaching. Part II
will begin by examining the types of mental disorders for which antipsychotic
medication is prescribed and the neurological effects of the specific drugs. This
Part will also explore potential side-effects that may result from the admin-
istration of antipsychotics and compare the advantages and disadvantages of
traditional versus new or "atypical" antipsychotics. Part III will address several
legal issues that may arise when defending "psychotic" capital defendants and
suggest specific strategies to manage those issues during capital proceedings.
This Part will also survey recent case law defining a defendant's right to refuse
the administration of antipsychotics and the implications of such a refusal for
trial strategy. Part lV will address ethical considerations that attorneys may face
when representing defendants suffering from psychotic mental illnesses. Finally,
Part V will consider jury instructions as a means of safeguarding the due process
rights of medicated defendants.
IL Scientific Analysis
A. Uses ofAntipychotics
The term "psychotic" is commonly used in the modern English language
to describe a person who exhibits abnormal or unusually violent behavior.4 In
the medical profession, however, "psychotic" carries a much more specific
meaning. It is used to describe a patient who suffers from a form of psychosis,
"a mental disorder characterized by gross impairment in reality testing as
evidenced by delusion, hallucinations, markedly incoherent speech, or
disorganized and agitated behavior, usually without apparent awareness on the
part of the patient of the incomprehensibility of his behavior."' Although
various forms of psychoses exist, "rtlhe persons most consistently considered
3. Id
4. See, e.g., Desson Thomson, An Old W'ives' Tale, WASH. POST, June 11, 2004, at T41
(describing a disgruntled film character's actions as going into "a psychotic shooting rage"); K.C.
Johnson, Kendall Gill's Piza'Diet, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 28, 2003, at Sports 10 (quoting Chicago Bulls
point guard Kendall Gill as having described his strict adherence to a four thousand calorie-per-day
diet as "psychotic").
5. DORAND'S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1489 (29th ed. 2000); see AM.
PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 273 (4th
ed. 2000) Ihereinafter DSM IV] (recognizing that while the meaning of the term psychotic is derived
from the word "psychosis," various definitions of "psychotic" exist).
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psychotic are those suffering from schizophrenia, the severe paranoid disorders
... the bipolar (manic-depressive) disorder, and the severe depressions."6
An overabundance of dopamine in the brain is a common physiological
factor in people suffering from psychosis! Dopamine is a hormone-like sub-
stance that is produced in the human brain and acts as a neurotransmitter' The
dopamine system serves as a mediator of reward-reinforcing mechanisms.9 For
example, a person who experiences a craving sensation, whether for nicotine,
alcohol, caffeine, or even extreme sports, also experiences a reward or satis-
faction sensation upon satiation. ° The dopamine system facilitates this reward
sensation by producing dopamine, which interacts with dopamine receptors
(which run what one might call the brain's "pleasure center"), which in turn
trigger the reward sensation." When dopamine is produced in abnormal levels,
however, the risk of developing mental illness increases. 2 For example,
schizophrenia is associated with an abnormally high level of dopaminergic
stimulation. 3 In addition, heavyuse of cocaine or amphetamines can trigger an
abnormally high level of dopamine production. 4 Use of these drugs for a long
period of time may lead to a drug-induced psychosis, characterized by many of
the symptoms of schizophrenia.
6. ROBERT G. MEYER, ABNORMAL BEHAVIOR AND THE QUMINALJUSTnc SYSTEM 114
(1992). In addition to the scientific resources cited throughout this article, the author relied heavily
on the explanations of the uses and effects of antipsychotics given by Barbara G. Haskins, M.D.
Interview with Barbara G. Haskins, M.D., Forensic Psychiatrist, Western State Hospital, in
Staunton, Va. (Aug. 23, 2004). Psychopharmacologist Kenneth I- Brasfield was also present at the
meeting and provided valuable information regarding the various antipsychotic agents available for
prescription, as well as the evolution of those drugs. Id
7. See ROBERT M. JULIEN, A PRIMER OF DRUG ACTION: A CONaSE, NONTE-IINICAL
GUIDE TO THE ACTIONS, USES, AND SIDE EFFECIS OF PSYCiOACTIVE DRUGS 491 (2001)
(explaining the "dopamine theory" of schizophrenia and the effect of antipsychotics on the
blockade of dopamine receptors); DANIEL M. PERRINE, THE C}EM1STRY OF MIND-ALTERING
DRUGS: HISTORY, PHARMACOLOGY, AND CULTURAL CONTEXT 23 (1996) (noting that schizophre-
nia is thought to be due to "an excess of dopaminergic stimulation"); MEYER, supra note 6, at 267
(recognizing the widely-held theory that various forms of psychoses are caused by an excess of
dopamine in the brain).
8. PERRINE, supra note 7, at 22-23 (explaining the mesotelencephalic dopamine system and
its role in the transmission of neurons in the central nervous system).
9. Id Seenra/yRoyA. Wise &Pierre P. Rompre, BrainDqniwardRezmri 40 ANNUAL
REV. OF PSYCHOL 191, 191-225 (1989) (discussing the role of dopamine in reward-reinforcing
mechanisms).
10. PERRINE, supra note 7, at 23.
11. Id
12. Id; JULIEN, supra note 7, at 491.
13. JULIEN, supra note 7, at 491.
14. PERRINE, supra note 7, at 23.
15. Id at 219. See neralyNora D. Volkow, DrugA bAeeandMentallness: Prcgs in Urler
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The symptoms of psychoses can be separated into two groups: (1) the
disorganization of thought content, meaning the substance of thoughts or lack
thereof; and (2) the disorganization of thought processes, characterized by a
loose association of single thoughts.'6 For example, schizophrenics are often
subject to "auditory hallucinations (usually hearing voices, often perceived as
hostile) [and] delusions concerning their own identity."'" They may often
experience "ideas of reference," a belief that the individual's thoughts are actually
being controlled by others. 8 In addition, schizophrenics experience abnor-
malities in social and motor behavior as well as speech and mental creativity. 9
While the specific symptoms of the different forms of psychoses may vary, the
most serious forms will almost always involve some combination of those
symptoms listed above. 0 As a result of the debilitating effects of these diseases,
capital defendants who suffer from some form of psychosis and have not
received treatment, via medication or otherwise, will in many cases be found
incompetent to stand trial."
Since the 1950's, medical professionals have used antipsychotic agents
(antipsychotics) to treat the various forms of psychoses and to normalize the
form and processes of the patients' thoughts.22 Antipsychotics, however, do not
cure the underlying disease; rather, they treat and reduce the symptoms and
effects of the disease.23 Traditional antipsychotics, such as haloperidol
(commonly known as Haldol) and thioridazine (commonly known as Mellaril),
simply block the patient's dopamine receptors and prevent the extremely severe
symptoms that psychotic patients often experience.' The efficacy of this type
of antipsychotic can be tied to the simplicity of the targeting mechanism.2' But
standing Comorbidiy, 158AM.J. PSYCHIATRY 1181 (2001) (noting the correlation between heavy drug
use, the overproduction of dopamine, and the eventual psychotic symptoms).
16. MEYER, supra note 6, at 116; Interview with Barbara G. Haskins, M.D., Forensic
Psychiatrist, Western State Hospital, in Staunton, Va. (Aug. 23, 2004).
17. PERRINE, supra note 7, at 220.
18. Id.
19. JULIEN, supra note 7, at 489-90.
20. See DSM IV, supra note 5, at 287 (noting the wide range of delusions and auditory
hallucinations experienced by schizophrenics).
21. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-169.1 (Michie Supp. 2003) (providing that a competency
evaluation is required if the court finds "that there is probable cause to believe that the defendant
... lacks substantial capacity to understand the proceedings against him or to assist his attorney in
his own defense").
22. GOODMAN & GILMAN'S THE PHARMACOLOGICAL BASIS OF THERAPEUTICS 485 (Joel
G. Hardman & Lee E. Limbird eds., 2001) [hereinafter "GOODMAN & GILMAN"].
23. PERRINE, supra note 7, at 222.
24. GOODMAN & GILMAN, supra note 22, at 485.
25. JULIEN, supra note 7, at 495.
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as discussed further below, these medications can have debilitating side effects..2 6
Administration of traditional antipsychotics can also be troublesome due to the
trial-and-error fashion in which dosage decisions are often made.27
The newer "atypical" antipsychotics, such as olanzapine (commonly known
as Zyprexa), risperidone (commonly known as Risperdal), and clozapine
(commonly known as Clozaril), were first introduced in the 1990's and also block
the dopamine receptors. 8 Their dopamine-blocking mechanism, however, is
balanced by blocking effects on serotonin, glutamate, and other neurons as
well.' This newer, balanced approach appears to produce similar beneficial
results with fewer side effects.3"
B. Potential Side Effects ofAntipoychotics
Almost all antipsychotics, although effective in counteracting the symptoms
of psychosis, have the potential to produce serious neurological side effects.3
Some of these side effects are most likely to appear just after treatment has
begun, but others may surface only after several months or years of treatment.
32
Dystonia, for example, which is characterized by "abnormal, long-sustained
posturing and grimacing of the neck, jaw, and eyes ... with spasms of the neck
or back and protrusion of the tongue," can occur within one to five days after
the initial administration of a drug.
33
Akathisia, parkinsonism, and tardive dyskinesia constitute what are known
as "extrapyramidal" side effects and occur more often with the administration
of traditional antipsychotics. 4 Akathisia is a syndrome that subjects the patient
to a "feeling of anxiety, accompanied by restlessness, pacing, constant rocking
back and forth, and other repetitive, purposeless actions. '35 Parkinsonism,
which resembles the symptoms of Parkinson's disease, "is characterized by
26. See injra Part lI.B. (discussing the side effects of both traditional and atypical
antipyschotics).
27. JULIEN, supra note 7, at 502, 504.
28. See id at 512-22 (describing in detail the history, effects, and side effects of various
atypical antipsychotics).
29. PERRINE, supra note 7, at 219.
30. See infra Part lI.B. (examining the side effects associated with various types of
antipsychotics and comparing the potential side effects caused by both traditional and newer
atypical antipsychofics). For a more complete comparison, see JULIEN, supra note 7, at 509-22 and
PERRINE, supra note 7, at 227-28.
31. GOODMAN & GILMAN, supra note 22, at 500.
32. See id. at 500-01 (noting that the "acute dystonia," "akathisia," and "parkinsonism" side
effects usually appear just after the commencement of treatment, but "tardive dyskinesia" and
"perioral tremor" are more likely to appear after treatment has been ongoing).
33. GOODMAN & GILMAN, supra note 22, at 501; PERRINE, supra note 7, at 222.




tremor at rest, rigidity of the limbs, and slowing of movement with a reduction
in spontaneous activity." '36 Perhaps the most serious of these side effects is
tardive dyskinesia, a condition with which the patient exhibits repetitive,
involuntary, -tic-like movements of the face, jaw, tongue, and trunk.37 This
condition is often irreversible and may continue even after administration of the
drug is discontinued.3" The new "atypical" antipsychotics, which rarely cause this
condition, can at times be used to counter this effect, but the condition may still
continue after cessation of the administration.39
In addition to these visible side effects, antipsychotics can also prompt
other side effects that may not be noticeable without closer scrutiny.' For
instance, some antipsychotics can induce sedation, drowsiness, blurred vision,
and, important in the case of a criminal defendant, memory dysfunction.41 When
experienced by a defendant during trial, these conditions may affect his ability to
communicate his thoughts and memories effectively and can impair his ability
to concentrate on the proceedings.4 2 To the lay observer, however, the defen-
dant's thought processes may appear to be functioning normally. This can prove
to be devastating to the defendant's fair trial rights as well as to his defense.43
While the new "atypical" drugs may produce less of the extrapyramidal side
effects, they do not come without a price. Administration of these anti-
psychotics is much more expensive than the traditional drugs.' Some of the
"atypical" drugs, specifically clozapine, create a risk of developing severe, life-
threatening blood diseases.4' Because of this risk, weekly to bi-weekly blood cell
monitoring is required.' Mental health agencies faced with budget constraints,
therefore, might administer the cheaper, traditional antipsychotics before turning
to newer drugs that require this added medical attention. 47 So, while psycho-
pharmaceudical advances have decreased the prevalence of serious side effects
resulting from the administration of antipsychotics, the cost and greater
complexity of administering the newer drugs may prevent the benefits of those
advances from being fully realized.
36. Id at 505.
37. GOODMAN & GILMAN, supra note 22, at 502; PERRINE, supra note 7, at 223.
38. GOODMAN & GILMAN, supra note 22, at 503.
39. JULIEN, supra note 7, at 501-02.
40. Id at 506-07.
41. Id at 497.
42. Id
43. See infra Part III (discussing a defendant's right to refuse medication and the preservation
of his fair trial rights while under the influence of antipsychotic medication).
44. JULIEN, supra note 7, at 515.
45. Id
46. Id
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1. Sell v. United States and its Progeny
In Sell v Un&e Stats,48 the United States Supreme Court addressed the
legality of a state's administration of antipsychotic medication to a non-
dangerous pretrial detainee against his will for the sole purpose of rendering him
competent to stand trial.49 The Court used a four-factor analysis to balance the
detainee's constitutionally guaranteed interests in a fair trial against the State's
interest in bringing a competent defendant to trial.50 To understand the specific
legal issues present in Sd, however, it is important to analyze the Supreme Court
cases that influenced that decision.51
In Wasbgton v Harper,2 the United States Supreme Court scrutinized a
Washington Department of Corrections policy that allowed the State to
administer antipsychotic drugs to a convicted inmate against his will. 3 The
policy in question allowed for such administration only after a psychiatrist
determined that: (1) the inmate suffered from a mental disorder, and (2) the
inmate was either "gravely disabled" or posed a threat of serious harm "to
himself, others, or their property." 4 In addition, the inmate was provided
certain procedural safeguards such as an administrative hearing before a qualified
committee and a periodic review of the effectiveness and necessity of the
administration.55
The defendant, Walter Harper, had been paroled in 1980 after serving four
years on a robbery charge.56 A year later, his parole was revoked after he
assaulted two nurses at a Seattle hospital.5" Harper was sent to the Special
Offender Center, a Washington Department of Corrections facility established
"to diagnose and treat convicted felons with serious mental disorders."58 Harper
was diagnosed as suffering from manic-depressive disorder and voluntarilybegan
48. 539 U.S. 166 (2003).
49. Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 175 (2003).
50. Id at 180-81.
51. Sw id at 177-180 (relying primarily on Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990) and
Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127 (1992)).
52. 494 U.S. 210 (1990).
53. Harper, 494 U.S. at 213.
54. Id at 215, 215 n.3.
55. Id at 215-16. The Court also noted that an inmate was afforded certain procedural rights
before, during, and after the administrative hearing. Id at 216. These included the right to notice,
the right to attend and present evidence, and the right to the assistance of a lay adviser who
understood the psychiatric issues involved. Id
56. Id at 213-14.




a treatment involving the administration of antipsychotics.59 In November 1982,
however, he refused to continue taking the medication.' His treating physician
then sought to administer the drugs against his will in accordance with the above
policy.61  Harper subsequently filed suit and claimed the prison procedure,
among other things, violated the Due Process Clauses of both the federal and
state constitutions.62
The Supreme Court first acknowledged that an inmate "possesses a
significant liberty interest in avoiding the unwanted administration of
antipsychotic drugs under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment." '63 The extent of this right, however, is flexible and "must be
defined in the context of the inmate's confinement."'  The Court weighed
Harper's interest in freedom from unwanted medication against the State's
interest in decreasing the danger he posed to others in the prison environment.6 5
The Court found the State's interest overwhelming in light of Harper's history
of violence and upheld the policy.66 "[Tihe Due Process Clause permits the State
to treat a prison inmate who has a serious mental illness with antipsychotic drugs
against his will, if the inmate is dangerous to himself or others and the treatment
is in the inmate's medical interest." 67
Two years later the Court again addressed the involuntary administration
of medication in Riggins v. Nevada.68 Unlike Harper, Riggins had not yet been
convicted when he refused to consent to the administration of antipsychotics.
69
Riggins, who faced charges of murder and robbery, told the jail psychiatrist a few
days after his arrest that he heard "voices in his head."7 He was subsequently
placed on a regimen of Mellaril that started at 100 milligrams per day and was
eventually increased to 800 milligrams per day.7' Riggins was evaluated by three
court-appointed psychiatrists over the following months while he was taking 450
59. Harper, 494 U.S. at 214. At the time this case was decided, Harper had also been
diagnosed with schizophrenia. Id at 214 n.2.
60. Id. at 214.
61. Id.
62. Id at 217.
63. Id. at 221-22; see U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (guaranteeing that no state shall "deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law").
64. Harper, 494 U.S. at 222.
65. Id. at 224-25.
66. Id. at 227.
67. Id.
68. R ggins, 504 U.S. at 129.
69. Id. at 130-31.
70. Id. at 129.
71. Id. Mellaril is the trade name for thioridazine. See GOODMAN & GILMAN, subra note 21,




milligrams of Mellaril per day.7 2 Two of the psychiatrists found him competent
to stand trial, and the trial court agreed.73
Prior to trial, Riggins moved the court for an order to cease the admin-
istration of the antipsychotic medication until the end of his trial.74 Riggins
argued that the drugs would affect "his demeanor and mental state during trial,"
thus denying him due process, and that his insanity defense entitled him to
"show the jurors his true mental state."75 After an evidentiary hearing at which
several psychiatrists made various predictions as to Riggins's possible mental
state if taken off the medication, the court denied his motion and Riggins was
continuously subjected to a dosage of 800 milligrams per day of Mellaril
throughout his trial.76 The jury convicted him of capital murder and sentenced
him to death.77 On appeal to the Supreme Court of Nevada, Riggins argued that
"forced administration of Mellaril denied him the ability to assist in his own
defense and prejudicially affected his attitude, appearance, and demeanor at
trial."7 " The Nevada court affirmed his convictions and sentence, and the United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide "whether forced adminis-
tration of antipsychotic medication during trial violated rights guaranteed by the
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments."79 The Court noted, however, that "[tihe
question whether a competent criminal defendant may refuse antipsychotic
medication if cessation of medication would render him incompetent at trial is
not before us."8
Reversing the lower court, the Court acknowledged that the Fourteenth
Amendment requires "at least as much protection" for pretrial detainees faced
with the involuntary administration of medication as the Harper requirement of
"a finding of overriding justification and a determination of medical app-
ropriateness."'" The Court also recognized that the trial court, during the
evidentiary hearing on Riggins's motion, failed completely to acknowledge the
"liberty interest in freedom from unwanted antipsychotics drugs" recognized in
Haper.82 In addition, the Court criticized the trial court's failure to investigate
72. Riggins, 504 U.S. at 129-30.
73. Id at 130.
74. Id.
75. Id
76. Id. at 130-31.
77. Id at 131.
78. Ri~gins, 504 U.S. at 131.
79. Id at 132-33.
80. Id at 136.
81. Id at 129, 135. The Court first refused to address Riggins's Eighth Amendment
argument that "administration of Mellaril denied him an opportunity to show jurors his true mental
condition at the sentencing hearing" due to his failure to raise the issue on appeal in state court.
Id at 133.
82. Id. at 137.
2004]
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the concerns Riggins and several of the psychiatrists had voiced regarding
possible side effects from taking 800 milligrams of Mellaril per day. 3 Riggins
was not, however, required to show that he was actually prejudiced at trial.'
Instead, the Court found that even if Riggins had presented expert testimony to
the jury regarding the effect of Mellaril on his demeanor, a "strong possibility"
and "unacceptable risk of prejudice remained." '8 5 Justice Kennedy wrote sep-
arately to state his view that "absent an extraordinary showing by the State," the
Due Process Clause prohibits states from administering antipsychotics against a
person's will for the purpose of rendering that person competent to stand trial.86
Both the majority and Justice Kennedy's concurrence set forth a number
of potentially prejudicial side effects of antipsychotics that may impact a
defendant's trial.87 For example, the majority noted that "[i]t is clearly possible
that [the] side effects [of the Mellaril] had an impact upon not just Riggins'
outward appearance, but also the content of his testimony on direct or cross
examination, his ability to follow the proceedings, or the substance of his
communication with counsel."88 In a more extensive discussion of possible side
effects, Justice Kennedy noted two principal ways in which the drugs may
prejudice a defendant: "(1) by altering his demeanor in a manner that will
prejudice his reactions and presentation in the courtroom, and (2) by rendering
him unable or unwilling to assist counsel."89
As to the first, Justice Kennedy recognized that the common side effects
of antipsychotics, such as tremors, restlessness, diminished range of facial
functions, and slowed speech and thought processes, could result in serious
prejudice to the defendant.9" "As any trial attorney will attest, serious prejudice
could result if medication inhibits the defendant's capacity to react and respond
to the proceedings and to demonstrate remorse or compassion."91 In particular,
Justice Kennedy placed great emphasis on the impact the side effects may have
on the sentencing process:
The prejudice can be acute during the sentencing phase of the
proceedings, when the sentencer must attempt to know the heart and
mind of the offender and judge his character, his contrition or its
absence, and his future dangerousness. In a capital sentencing
83. Id.
84. See Riggins, 504 U.S. at 137 ("Efforts to prove or disprove actual prejudice from the
record before us would be futile .... We accordingly reject the dissent's suggestion that Riggins
should be required to demonstrate how the trial would have proceeded differently if he had not
been given Mellaril.").
85. Id. at 137-38.
86. Id. at 138-39 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
87. Id. at 137-38; Id. at 142-45 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
88. Id. at 137.
89. Id at 142 (Kennedy,J., concurring).
90. Riggins, 504 U.S. at 142-43 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
91. Id. at 143--44.
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proceeding, assessments of character and remorse may carry great
weight and, perhaps, be determinative of whether the offender lives
or dies.9 2
As for the second category of potential prejudice, Justice Kennedy found
that "[tihe side effects of antipsychotic drugs can hamper the attorney-client
relation, preventing effective communication and rendering the defendant less
able or willing to take part in his defense."93 An impairment of the attorney-
defendant relationship would, thus, jeopardize the defendant's Sixth Amendment
right to the effective assistance of counsel.94 Justice Kennedy opined that a
defendant must be able to provide information to his counsel in a timely manner
and must have the cognitive capacity to participate in the decision-making
process.
95
Justice Kennedy's concurrence calls for a more strict standard for
determining the constitutionality of forced medication to non-dangerous pretrial
detainees, as in Riggins, as compared with the "dangerous" prisoner in Haper.
96
After all, those in the pretrial stage have essential fair trial interests at stake.9
Interestingly, both the Riggins majority and concurrence distinguish between
mere competency to stand trial and a defendant's ability to effectively appear,
give testimony, and communicate with counsel.98 After R'g gins, then, a court may
not simply shrug off a defendant's claim of possible prejudice to his fair trial
rights merely because he has been found competent to stand trial.
92. Id at 144.
93. Id.
94. Id.; see also Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201,205-06 (1964) (holding that a defen-
dant's Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel is jeopardized when he cannot
assist his counsel).
95. Riggins, 504 U.S. at 144 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
96. Id at 140-41 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy distinguished Harperas a case
involving an "objective and manageable" inquiry, namely whether the defendant was dangerous.
Id. at 140 (KennedyJ., concurring). Justice Kennedy viewed the inquiry into whether Riggins was
competent as requiring much more care:
The avowed purpose of the medication is not functional competence, but competence
to stand trial. In my view elementary protections against state intrusion require the
State in every case to make a showing that there is no significant risk that the medica-
tion will impair or alter in any material way the defendant's capacity or willingness to
react to the testimony at trial or to assist his counsel ... I have substantial reservations
that the State can make that showing ....
Id. at 141 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
97. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 545 (1979) ("[P]retrial detainees, who have not been
convicted of any crimes, retain at least those constitutional rights that we have held are enjoyed by
convicted prisoners.").
98. See Riggins, 504 U.S. at 136-37 (finding that the lower court erred in not considering
whether the side effects of the drugs would impair his fair trial rights, even though cessation might
have rendered him incompetent); id. at 142 (Kennedy,J., concurring) (concluding that although the
antipsychotics may have rendered a defendant competent to stand trial, the drugs may prejudice him
during trial).
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Justice Kennedy's concurrence respecting involuntary medication solely to
render a criminal defendant competent for trial set the tone for the Court's
recent decision in Sell.99 In 1997 Charles Sell, a practicing dentist, was accused
of submitting fraudulent insurance claims in violation of federal law.'0° Sell was
charged with mail and Medicaid fraud, money laundering, and later with the
attempted murders of the FBI agent who had arrested him and of a potential
witness against him.'
In early 1999 a federal magistrate found that Sell was incompetent to stand
trial and ordered him hospitalized to determine whether his competence could
be restored.12 After diagnosing him with a delusional disorder, the treating
psychiatrist sought to administer antipsychotics to Sell.'03 When Sell refused,
however, a reviewing psychiatrist authorized the administration of the drugs
against his will "because Sell was mentally ill and dangerous,. . . medication is
necessary to treat the mental illness, and.., so that Sell would become comp-
etent for trial."'" The magistrate who had ordered Sell's original hospitalization
affirmed the psychiatrist's finding of dangerousness and noted that Sell had since
been moved to a locked cell after making inappropriate remarks to a nurse.
05
The magistrate then issued an order authorizing the involuntary administration
of antipsychotic medication because, among other things, Sell was dangerous and
there was a "substantial probability" the drugs would return him to
competency. 1
6
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri
disagreed with the classification of Sell as being "dangerous" but affirmed the
magistrate's order because administration of the antipsychotic drugs was
"medically appropriate" and "necessary to serve the government' s compelling
interest in obtaining an adjudication of [Sell's] guilt or innocence of numerous
and serious charges."'0 7 The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit affirmed.' The Eighth Circuit held that the Government's interest in
99. See Sell, 539 U.S. at 179 (pronouncing the standard for the involuntary administration of
antipsychotics to a defendant solely for the purpose of rendering him competent to stand trial). For
a complete discussion of Sell and its application to Virginia capital murder cases, see generally
Meghan H. Morgan, Case Note, 16 CAP. DEF.J. 295 (analyzing Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166
(2003)).
100. Sell, 539 U.S. at 170.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 170-71.
103. Id. at 171.
104. Id. at 171-72. The reviewing psychiatrist found Sell to be dangerous based on "threats
and delusions if outside, but not necessarily inside prison." Id. at 172. In fact, the psychiatrist found
"that Sell was able to function in prison in the open population." Id
105. Id. at 172-73.
106. Sell, 539 U.S. at 173.
107. Id. at 173-74.
108. Id at 174-75. The Eighth Circuit also affirmed the district court's finding that Sell was
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bringing Sell to trial was essential and that the administration of the drugs was
medically appropriate and the least intrusive means of rendering him
competent. "
The United States Supreme Court, however, vacated the Eighth Circuit's
decision."' Relying on its decisions in Haper and Riggins, the Court held that a
state may administer antipsychotic drugs to a mentally ill defendant against his
will solely for the purpose of rendering him competent to stand trial only if the
treatment: (1) "is medically appropriate"; (2) "is substantially unlikely to have side
effects that may undermine the fairness of the trial"; and (3) "taking account of
less intrusive alternatives, is necessary significantly to further important
governmental trial-related interests."' The Court cautioned that these instances
may be rare because a court must also find that four additional circumstances are
present."
2
First, an important governmental interest must be at stake.' The Court
acknowledged that the governmental interest in bringing to trial a defendant
charged with serious crimes is "important."".. Certainly in the case of an
individual accused of capital murder, the interest in bringing him to court is most
compelling."' That importance, however, is countered by the government's
"concomitant, constitutionally essential interest in assuring that the defendant's
trial is a fair one. '  The Court also recognized that the importance of pros-
ecution in a given case may be lessened by "special circumstances," such as the
possibility that the defendant's refusal to take the drugs would lead to
confinement in a mental institution."
7
Second, the involuntary administration of the drugs must significantly
further the state's concomitant interests.' In other words, a court must find
that the administration is "substantially likely" to render the defendant
competent and, at the same time, is "substantially unlikely" to induce side effects
that "will interfere significantly with the defendant's ability to assist counsel in
not dangerous. Id at 174.
109. Id
110. Id. at 186.
111. Id at 179.
112. Sell, 539 U.S. at 180.
113. Id.
114. Id; see also Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 361-62 (1997) (recognizing that the "two
primary objectives of criminal punishment" are "retribution and deterrence'; Moran v. Burbine,
475 U.S. 412, 426 (1986) (providing that society has a "compelling interest in finding, convicting,
and punishing those who violate the law").
115. Sell, 539 U.S. at 180.
116. Id
117. Id
118. Id at 181.
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conducting a trial defense.""' 9 As discussed below, this requirement may afford
the greatest protection to mentally ill capital defendants.
12
1
Third, the medication must be necessay to further the state's concomitant
interests.12' For example, there may exist non-drug therapies that could restore
the defendant to competence. 12 2 The court must find, then, that any less
intrusive means are "unlikely to achieve substantially the same results" as the
involuntary administration of drugs.
123
Finally, the administration of the drugs must be "medically appropriate. 
24
The Court defined "medically appropriate" as being "in the patient's best medical
interest in light of his medical condition.', 125 Therefore, a court may consider
different kinds of antipsychotics that produce similar beneficial results without
triggering similar side effects.
26
Before applying this standard to the case before it, the Court cautioned that
these four conditions need not be considered by a court if a defendant is found
to be "dangerous.' 27 In such a case, the standard enunciated in Haper would
control a court's decision, and the state could medicate the defendant against his
will if it was "medically appropriate.' 28 In fact, the SellCourt recommended that
"a court, asked to approve forced administration of drugs for purposes of
rendering a defendant competent to stand trial, should ordinarily determine
whether the Government seeks, or has first sought, permission for forced
administration of drugs on these other Harper-type grounds; and, if not, why
not."'129 This makes clear that a court will consider the defendant's danger-
ousness first before reaching the considerations set forth in Sell.3°
In accordance with the findings of the district court and Eighth Circuit, the
Court first assumed that Sell was not dangerous and thereby bypassed a review
of the decision to medicate under Harper.'' Applying the four considerations
governing the involuntary medication of non-dangerous defendants, the Court
119. Id.
120. See infra text accompanying notes 175-209 (discussing potential substantive arguments
regarding the impairment of a capital defendant's fair trial rights).






127. Sell, 539 U.S. at 181-82.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 183.
130. Id.
131. Id at 183-84. The Court suggested that the record did contain evidence of Sell's
dangerousness but noted that neither party had raised the issue of dangerousness on appeal. Id.;
see also infra note 141.
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then held that the lower courts had erred in affirming the magistrate's order.'
32
Because the magistrate had approved forced medication based on Sell's
dangerousness and the drugs' probability of rendering him competent to stand
trial, the Court found that the focus of the hearing before the magistrate had, in
fact, been on Sell's dangerousness. 33 As such, the experts who had testified did
not address the possible trial-related side effects of the antipsychotic
treatment."' In fact, the hospital's experts had conceded that the proposed
treatment had "significant side effects and there has to be a cost benefit
analysis.' '135 The Court concluded that the experts, in performing their cost
benefit analysis, "primarily took into account Sell's dangerousness, not the need
to bring him to trial.',
136
Analyzing this failure under the Court's second consideration, that the
administration is "substantially unlikely" to induce side effects that "will interfere
significantly with the defendant's ability to assist counsel," the Sell Court
concluded that "[tihe failure to focus upon trial competence could well have
mattered.' 37 CitingJustice Kennedy's concurrence in Riggins, the Court set forth
several concerns that may not necessarily be relevant when dangerousness is at
issue but are relevant to the permissibility of treatment solely for rendering a
defendant competent.'3 For instance, the magistrate should have determined
whether the treatment would interfere with Sell's ability to communicate
effectively with counsel, whether the treatment would prevent Sell from reacting
to trial developments in a rapid fashion, and whether the treatment would impair
Sell's ability to express emotion.' Based on the magistrate's failure to consider
these circumstances and their potential to undermine the fairness of Sell's trial,
the Court reversed the order to administer the antipsychotics. 4
2. Dangerousness After Sell
It is important to first recognize that while the Sell standard offers
heightened protection of a pretrial capital defendant's fair trial interests, the
prosecution will presumably seek to have the defendant medicated on the basis
that he is dangerous to himself or others. The Sell Court, however, failed to
enunciate a standard for determining when a pretrial detainee is "dangerous"
132. Sell, 539 U.S. at 185.
133. Id
134. Id
135. Id. (internal citations omitted).
136. Id.
137. Id. at 181,185.





and, thus, subject to the less-restrictive Harperstandard for forced medication. 4 '
The district court had overturned the magistrate's finding of dangerousness,
which had been based primarily on Sell's inappropriate behavior with the medical
center nurses and his accompanying mental illness. 42 The question remains:
When, and by whom, can a pretrial capital defendant be deemed dangerous?
The Haper Court held that the Washington Bureau of Prisons, through an
administrative process and with the recommendation of medical professionals,
could rightfully make the determination whether the inmate was "dangerous"
and, thus, in need of forced medication.'43 In cases such as this, an admin-
istrative finding of dangerousness can be appealed to determine whether that
finding was arbitrary or capricious.'" The SellCourt, on the other hand, implied
that a judicial hearing was required before forcibly medicating a non-dangerous
pretrial detainee to restore competency. 4 In Sell, the Court repeatedly referred
to the "court" when describing the four factors that must be addressed in
applying the standard for pretrial detainees."4 It can be inferred, then, that
because a non-dangerous pretrial detainee retains a constitutionally-protected
interest in a fair trial, the decision to forcibly medicate demands a more stringent
analysis, and by implication, a judicial analysis. 147 But the Sell Court did not
decide whether a pretrial detainee can be deemed "dangerous" outside of the
judicial process."
The standard for determining dangerousness is also still undefined. A
pretrial capital defendant who has been deemed incompetent to stand trial will
most likely be sent to a state mental hospital for restoration.'49 But must the
141. Id. at 184. The Sel/Court, in dicta, did opine that the record supported the magistrate's
finding of dangerousness. Id. But because neither of the parties raised the issue, the Court stated
that it was forced to accept the district court and Eighth Circuit's reversals of that finding and
assume Sell was non-dangerous. See id. (stating that the Court assumed that Sell was not dangerous
"on_4 because the Government did not contest, and the parties have not argued, that particular
matter"). The Court, thus, seemed to imply that Sell's inappropriate conduct with the nurses, even
though it did not involve overt acts or threats, might have been enough to support a finding of
dangerousness. Id.
142. Id.
143. Harper, 494 U.S. at 228 (holding that the administrative hearing procedures set by the
policy in question "do comport with procedural due process").
144. See Administrative Procedure Act of 1946,5 U.S.C. § 706 (2000) (stating that a court may
review agency action and set aside that action if it finds the agency's conclusions to be "arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law").
145. Sell, 539 U.S. at 180-83.
146. Id
147. Id.
148. See supra note 141 and accompanying text (explaining the Court's reliance on the lower
courts' finding of non-dangerousness).
149. See 18 U.S.C. § 4241 (d) (2000) (providing that upon a finding "by a preponderance of the
evidence" that the defendant is incompetent to stand trial, "the court shall commit the defendant
to the custody of the Attorney General," who "shall hospitalize the defendant for treatment"); VA.
CODE ANN. § 19.2-169.1 (Michie Supp. 2003) (providing that upon finding a defendant is incompe-
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setting be taken into account in evaluating a defendant's dangerousness? A
defendant may pose a danger to others while awaiting trial in the general jail
population; that risk, however, may be diminished when he is moved to the
hospital for restoration of competency."'0 In Sell, for example, the district court
found that he was not dangerous based on his "dangerousness at this time to
himself and to those around him in his institutionalcontext."15' While this issue was
not challenged on appeal, and accordingly not addressed by the Supreme Court,
the standard used by the district court still does not describe the type of conduct
that gives rise to a finding of dangerousness.5 2
Following the Supreme Court's decision in Riggins, but before Sell, the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia addressed the
question of when a defendant is considered dangerous." 3 Russell Weston was
charged with entering the United States Capitol building, opening fire, and killing
two United States Capitol Police officers.">1 After being found incompetent and
hospitalized for restoration, Weston refused the administration of antipsychotic
medication.5 5 The Bureau of Prisons, after an administrative hearing, decided
to medicate Weston against his will based on his dangerousness to himself and
others.5 6 The district court affirmed the agency's decision and found that the
medication was "essential for the defendant's own safety or the safety of
others."'
157
The Court of Appeals, however, reversed the district court's finding of
Weston's dangerousness based, in part, on insufficient evidence.'58 The court,
relying primarily on testimony given at the administrative hearing by Weston's
treating psychiatrist, found that the evidence presented indicated that "in his
current circumstances Weston poses no significant danger to himself or to
others." ' 9 The psychiatrist, although testifying as an expert for the Government,
had stated that given Weston's "immediate containment situation," she was
"confident the [prison] staff can prevent him from harming himself or others
under his immediate parameters of incarceration where he is in an individual
room with limited access to anything that he could harm himself with or anyone
tent to stand trial, the court shallorder treatment to restore his competency and may order that
treatment on an inpatient basis at a state hospital).
150. See supranote 149 (setting forth the federal and Virginia statutes governing the restoration
of competency for criminal defendants).
151. Sell, 539 U.S. at 174 (internal quotations omitted).
152. Id. at 184.
153. United States v. Weston, 206 F.3d 9 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
154. Id. at 11.
155. Id. at 11-12.
156. Id. at 12.
157. United States v. Weston, 69 F. Supp. 2d 99, 118 (D.D.C. 1999).




else with, and he remains under constant observation."' 6 ° The court found this
testimony, in light of the little evidence presented on the issue of safety, was
sufficient to overturn the finding of dangerousness.' 6'
The Weston decision, although not binding outside the D.C. Circuit, offers
valuable insight into the procedure and standard for determining dangerousness.
For one, Weston was a pretrial detainee who was found to be dangerous by way
of an administrative hearing; thus he was left with only an appeal to the judicial
process for relief. 6 2 The district court had reviewed the agency's finding of
dangerousness substantively under a "reasonableness" standard and procedurally
under the Administrative Procedure Act's "arbitrary and capricious" standard. '63
It is important to note, however, that this issue has still not reached the United
States Supreme Court.
Also of importance, the Weston court's determination of the sufficiency of
the evidence focused on the defendant's dangerousness in the institutional
context at the time of the hearing."64 Specifically, the treating psychiatrist's
assurance that the prison staff could ensure safety while Weston was in isolation
seemed crucial to the court's determination.6 ' Under this standard, then,
defense counsel should strive to have the defendant isolated from the general
population during the pretrial stages so as to diminish the possibility that he will
pose a danger to himself or others. In any event, isolation will certainly diminish
the chances the defendant will pose a threat to persons other than himself. So,
while the Weston court's determination that the record did not support a finding
of dangerousness did little more than provide interesting insight into other
courts'possible interpretation of the Harperdangerousness standard, that standard
and the process for determining when and by whom a pretrial capital defendant
may be deemed "dangerous" are still largely undefined and require further
clarification by the courts.
3. Strategy ajter Sell
As is evident from recent case law, the capital defendant's right to refuse the
administration of antipsychotics is far from guaranteed. 6 6 In fact, with the
uncertainty surrounding the classification of a defendant as "dangerous," the
chance a court will even weigh the Sell factors may be slim. In the event,
however, the prosecution fails to, or cannot, compel the administration of
antipsychotic medication based on the defendant's dangerousness, and is thus
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 11.
163. Id. at 12.
164. Weston, 206 F.3d at 13.
165. Id.
166. See supra notes 148-65 and accompanying text (discussing the evolution of a defendant's
right to refuse medication through recent case law).
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forced to rely on the rationale of restoration of competence, it is critical that
defense counsel preserve the right to refuse the treatment before trial.
Therefore, as soon as that defendant refuses to take the antipsychotic
medication, whether of his own volition or on the advice of his attorney, any
further administration of the drugs is involuntary and counsel should file a
motion to prevent or cease the involuntary administration of those drugs.'67 The
basis for a non-dangerous defendant's argument is twofold: first, the side effects
of the drugs will deprive the defendant of his right to due process under the
Fourteenth Amendment; and second, if found guilty, the continued admin-
istration of the drugs during the sentencing phase will deprive him of his rights
under the Eighth Amendment to a reliable determination of whether the death
penalty should be imposed and to have the sentencer consider all relevant
mitigating evidence.1
68
The Harper Court recognized that an individual "possesses a significant
liberty interest in avoiding the unwanted administration of antipsychotic drugs
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."' 69 That interest,
according to the first Sell factor, may be countered by the prosecution's interest
in rendering the defendant competent and bringing him to stand trial.' In fact,
the more serious the crime, the more compelling the prosecution's interest in
seeking justice through the judicial system.'7 ' But the Se#lCourt also recognized
that the prosecution has an equally compelling "concomitant" interest in
ensuring each defendant is afforded a fair trial.7 2 Furthermore, courts have long
recognized that in capital cases, "the finality of the sentence imposed warrants
protections that ... may not be required in other cases."'7 3 The heightened
importance of bringing a capital defendant to stand trial, then, appears to be
equally diminished by the heightened importance of assuring that both the trial
and sentencing proceedings are fair.' 4
The SellCourt's second factor opens the door for a defendant's substantive
arguments regarding the impairment of his fair trial rights.7 5 In both Selland
Rz'ggins, the Court placed great emphasis on the effects of antipsychotics on a
167. Please contact the Virginia Capital Case Clearinghouse at (540) 458-8557 for a sample
motion for the cessation of the involuntary administration of antipsychotics prior to trial.
168. See U.S. CONsT. amend. VIII ("Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (preventing
the states from "depriv[ing] any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law").
169. Harper, 494 U.S. at 221-22.
170. Sell, 539 U.S. at 179-80.
171. Id. at 180.
172. Id.
173. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 87 (1985) (Burger, C.J., concurring).
174. Sell, 539 U.S. at 180.
175. See supra, notes 118-20 (outlining the second factor considered by the SellCourt).
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defendant's ability to assist counsel.176 Both opinions recognized that although
a defendant has been deemed competent to stand trial, antipsychotics may have
an effect on a defendant's ability to interact with counsel.
77
In Virginia, the competency standard reflects the constitutional necessity of
the defendant's capacity to assist counsel.'78 Virginia Code section 19.2-169.1
provides:
A. If, at any time after the attorney for the defendant has been
retained or appointed and before the end of trial, the court finds, upon
hearing evidence or representations of counsel for the defendant or
the attorney for the Commonwealth, that there is probably cause to
believe that the defendant.., lacks substantial capacity to understand
the proceedings against him or to assist his attorney in his own
defense, the court shall order that a competency evaluation be
performed by at least one psychiatrist, clinical psychologist or master's
level psychologist who is qualified by training and experience in
forensic evaluation.
E. .. The fact that the defendant claims to be unable to remember
the time period surrounding the alleged offense shall not, by itself, bar
a finding of competency if the defendant otherwise understands the
charges against him and can assist in his defense. Nor shall the fact
that the defendant is under the influence of medication bar a finding
of competency if the defendant is able to understand the charges
against him and assist in his defense while medicated.
179
This statute, however, addresses the importance of assuring a defendant's ability
to assist counsel in advance of trial, or, in other words, in preparing his defense.
180
Such assistance varies greatly from the assistance required of a defendant at trial
in order to be effective. 8' During the pretrial period, a defendant can effectively
176. Sell, 539 U.S. at 185; Riggins, 504 U.S. at 137, 144 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
177. See Sell, 539 U.S. at 181 (requiring that a court find that the administration of
antipsychotics to render the defendant competent is "substantially unlikely to have side effects that
will interfere significantly with the defendant's ability to assist counsel in conducting a trial defense,
thereby rendering the trial unfair"); Riggins, 504 U.S. at 137 (finding that even though the administra-
tion of the Mellaril may have rendered Riggins competent to stand trial, the district court did not
acknowledge the drugs' possible impact upon "the substance of his communication with counsel").
178. The Virginia statute, of course, merely codifies the constitutional standard for incompe-
tency. See Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960) (per curiam) (establishing the test of a
defendant's competency to stand trial as "whether he has sufficient present ability to consult with
his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding-and whether he has a rational as well
as factual understanding of the proceedings against him"). The Supreme Court has recently
confirmed the validity of the Duskj standard. See Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 354 (1996)
(citing the Dusky standard as a "well settled" test for determining competency).
179. VA, CODE ANN. § 19.2-169.1 (Michie Supp. 2003).
180. Id.
181. See Rigins, 504 U.S. at 144 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (noting that a defendant's right to
the effective assistance of counsel is impaired when the defendant is not "able to provide needed
information to a lawyer and to participate in the making of decisions on his own behalf").
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assist counsel by recounting the events surrounding the time of the alleged
offense and recalling names of persons who may testify in his defense.
Attorneys are given an adequate pretrial period to extract this information from
a defendant and to incorporate it into his defense.
18 2
During trial, however, a defendant's awareness and responsiveness are ess-
ential.183 Both Selland Justice Kennedy's concurrence in Ri'ggins recognize that
the effective assistance of a defendant's counsel during trial requires a "rapid"
response and reaction to the proceedings."8 For instance, an alert defendant
may, upon hearing or viewing the trial testimony of a witness against him,
provide his counsel with useful information that counsel may be pursue on
cross-examination or use to impeach the witness. 18 5 A defendant under the
influence of traditional antipsychotics, which have been shown to impair
concentration and memory, may be prevented from relaying this information to
his counsel in a timely manner. 6
Another important due process right that the administration of anti-
psychotics during trial may compromise is the defendant's right to present
himself in the most favorable light.187 In Estelle v. Williams,'88 the defendant's
request to appear at his murder trial in civilian clothes was denied, and he was
forced to appear in clothes that "were distinctly marked as prison issue.' 189 The
United States Supreme Court, granting Williams's petition for habeas relief, held
that because defendants have a compelling interest in the presumption of
innocence, any state action which threatens that protection must be justified by
a countervailing government interest. 90 In other words, the right to present
one's self in the most favorable light corresponds with the defendant's interest
in being accorded the presumption of innocence. In addition, while the
182. See DeToro v. Pepersack, 332 F.2d 341,342-43 (4th Cir. 1964) (finding a defendant "has
the right to have counsel appointed sufficiently in advance of trial to make adequate preparation").
183. See Sell, 539 U.S. at 185 (recognizing the danger in administering antipsychotics which
may "prevent rapid reaction to trial developments").
184. Id.; Riggins, 504 U.S. at 144 (Kennedy,J., concurring) (observing that "[t]he side effects
of antipsychotics drugs can hamper the attorney-client relation, preventing effective communica-
tion'".
185. See Riggins, 504 U.S. at 144 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (noting the importance of a defen-
dant's ability to react to the proceedings).
186. See "supra text accompanying notes 40-43 (discussing the less-visible side effects of
antipsychotic medication, including sedation, drowsiness, or memory dysfunction).
187. See Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 503 (1976) (holding that "[t]he right to a fair trial
is a fundamental liberty secured by the Fourteenth Amendment" and that the presumption of
innocence is a "basic component" of that fair trial); Johnson v. Commonwealth, 449 S.E.2d 819,
821 (Va. 1994) (stating that "[i]t is inappropriate for a trial court to deny a courtroom participant
the right to present himself in his best posture").
188. 425 U.S. 501 (1976).
189. Estelle, 425 U.S. at 502.
190. Id. at 504-05, 513.
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prosecution can claim it has an interest in bringing a capital defendant to trial, it
also has a "duty to see that the accused is accorded a fair trial," and that
conviction "rest[s] upon reason alone, and not upon appeals to emotion,
sympathy, passion, or prejudice."' 9'
A defendant who is forced to appear before the jury under the influence of
antipsychotics may suffer prejudice to the presumption of innocence similar to
the potential prejudice inherent in appearing before the jury in prison garb.
192
For instance, a defendant suffering visible side effects, such as tardive dyskinesia
or akathisia, may be perceived as being nervous or restless, and this in turn may
lead the jury to misread his level of comfort as to the testimony being given or,
if testifying, his credibility. 193 Furthermore, the often numbing effects of the
antipsychotics could make the defendant appear remorseless and apathetic. 194
In every criminal case, the defendant's demeanor is under the constant scrutiny
of the jury.195 For this reason, a defendant must remain cognizant of, and in
control of, his demeanor.
In a capital sentencing proceeding, the ability to control one's demeanor is
even more important and may make a difference as to whether the defendant
receives a sentence of death or life in prison.'96 Jurors often place considerable
weight on the remorsefulness of the defendant, or lack thereof, for the crime of
which he has been convicted. 197 A defendant must therefore be able to express
his true emotional state through his demeanor. In addition, a defendant who is
unable to control his bodily movements due to side effects may be viewed by the
jury as being unable to control himself generally. This may lead the jury to
believe that the defendant's lack of control makes him prospectively dangerous
191. Harrison v. Commonwealth, 32 S.E.2d 136, 140 (Va. 1944).
192. Seegenerally Estelle, 425 U.S. at 501.
193. See supra notes 34-39 and accompanying text (discussing the more severe extrapyramidal
side effects of antipsychotics).
194. See smpra text accompanying notes 40-43 (discussing the effects of antipsychotic medica-
tion on brain function).
195. See Riggins, 504 U.S. at 142 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (noting that "[i]t is a fundamental
assumption of the adversary system that the trier of fact observes the accused throughout the trial"
and that "the defendant's behavior, manner, facial expressions, and emotional responses, or their
absence, combine to make an overall impression on the trier of fact.., that can have a powerful
influence on the outcome of the trial").
196. See id at 144 (KennedyJ., concurring) (recognizing that in capital cases, "assessments of
character and remorse may carry great weight and, perhaps, be determinative of whether the
[defendant] lives or dies').
197. See id. (Kennedy,J., concurring) (stating that the ability to show remorsefulness is critical
in the sentencing phase of a capital case as "the sentencer must attempt to know the heart and mind
of the offender and judge his character, his contrition or its absence, and his future dangerous-
ness"); Scott Sundby, The Capita!Juy andAbsolution: The Intersection of Trial Strategy, Remorse, and the
Death Penaly, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1557, 1565 (1998) (noting that studies have shown that




to others. 9 The likelihood of such prejudice, as well as its severe effect on the
fate of the defendant, appears to outweigh any possible interest the prosecution
may have in bringing the defendant to trial.
A capital defendant may also have a strong argument, under the Eighth
Amendment, that the forced administration of antipsychotics during the
sentencing phase will unfairly prejudice his efforts to present mitigating evidence
which may persuade the jury to impose a sentence less than death.'99 The United
States Supreme Court has recognized that in a capital case, the sentencer must be
permitted to consider "as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant's
character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense. ,2' A mental
disorder so severe that it has induced the state to administer antipsychotic drugs
against his will appears necessarily to be mitigating evidence.20 ' A juror con-
sidering this mental condition might find the defendant to be less culpable and,
thus, less deserving of a death sentence.0 2 However, a defendant's argument
that he was mentally ill at the time of the offense would probably carry less
weight if the jury sees before it a calm and impassive defendant.
203
In addition, as mentioned above, a defendant under the influence of anti-
psychotics may not have the ability to show his true emotions.1 4 The defen-
dant's remorse for the crime is certainly a mitigating factor and, if present, can
sway a juror's recommendation from death to life.20 5 It follows, then, that any
action by the Government that prevents this type of mitigating evidence from
being introduced and considered during the sentencing phase violates clear
198. SeeVA. CODEANN. § 19.2-264.2 (Michie Supp. 2003) (prohibiting a jury from imposing
a sentence of death in a capital murder case unless it finds "there is a probability that the defendant
would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing serious threat to society
or that his conduct in committing the offense for which he stands charged was outrageously or
wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman").
199. See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII ("Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.").
200. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (plurality opinion).
201. See Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 885 (1983) (noting that a defendant's mental illness
may mitigate the penalty); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.4(B) ("Facts in mitigation may include...
(ii) the capital felony was committed while the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental
or emotional disturbance... (iv) at the time of the commission of the capital felony, the capacity
of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct ... was significantly impaired.").
202. While evidence of mental illness introduced during the sentencing phase is not offered
as an excuse for the defendant's actions, it does open the door for jurors' compassion. C.f. Atkins
v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304,319-20 (observing that because the mentally retarded are less culpable the
deterrence theory supporting the death penalty does not apply).
203. See supra text accompanying notes 140-43 (noting the possible sedative side effects of
antipsychotic medication).
204. See supra Part II.B. (discussing the potential side effects of antipsychotic medication).






These arguments must be advanced prior to the start of capital proceedings
and with enough time to allow the prejudicial side effects of the medication to
subside.20 7 Of course, as each case calls for a different trial strategy, the cessation
of medication may not be in the defendant's legal interest. -"8 For example,
counsel may utilize the visible side effects of the drugs to suggest that the
defendant was so mentally ill that he was unable to control his actions at the time
of the offense.' ° On the other hand, the defendant may simply refuse to stop
taking the antipsychotics. Whatever the case, it appears best to advance the
arguments and preserve the right to refuse at the time of trial.
B. Monitoring the Defendant's Treatment Before and During Capital Proceedings
Regardless of whether a court orders the involuntary administration of
antipsychotics, defense counsel should pay particular attention to the specific
treatments to which their client is subjected. An open line of communication
between counsel and the treating psychiatrist is essential to keep the attorney
apprised of any developments in the mental condition of the defendant, as well
as changes made in the type or amount of antipsychotics being administered.
This line of communication should be established at the time treatment is
recommended or the appointment of counsel, whichever occurs first.
As the trial approaches, it is particularly important to keep aware of the
defendant's treatment regimen. The treating psychiatrist may want to make
changes in the type or amount of medication due to side effects the defendant
may be experiencing or the ineffectiveness of the drugs."0 These changes pose
a risk of new side effects, including some that may render the defendant unable
to assist counsel, unable to meaningfully participate in the proceedings, or even
wholly incompetent to stand trial. 21' Defense counsel should bring to the court's
206. See Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104,113-15 (1982) (holding that the Eighth Amend-
ment requires that a defendant not be precluded, as a matter of law, from presenting to the
sentencer any relevant mitigating evidence); Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604 (plurality opinion) (holding that
in a capital case, a sentencer must be permitted to consider the defendant's character and record as
a mitigating factor). Seegenera/l Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989) (holding the Texas capital
sentencing scheme did not adequately provide for the jury's consideration of mental retardation as
a mitigating factor); Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393 (1987) (providing that non-statutory
mitigating factors must be considered); Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1 (1986) (holding that
a capital defendant's positive adjustment to fife in prison prior to trial is relevant mitigating evidence
admissible during the sentencing phase).
207. JULIEN, supra note 7, at 501-02 (noting that side effects may still continue even after
ceasing the administration of antipsychotics).
208. See infra notes 235-38 and accompanying text (discussing the conflict between a client's
legal, ethical, and medical interests).
209. See supra notes 199-203 and accompanying text (discussing the use of a capital defen-
dant's mental illness as mitigating evidence).
210. See spra Part II.B. (discussing the potential side effects of antipsychotic medication).
211. See supra notes 175-95 and accompanying text (describing a number of ways in which a
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attention any changes in the medication regimen which may threaten to impinge
on the defendant's fair trial rights. In any case, those changes should be fully
documented on a daily basis to ensure a full record for appellate review.
As mentioned earlier, the cost of "atypical" antipsychotics, which cause
fewer side effects, by far exceeds the cost of the traditional antipsychotics. 212 As
a result, a pretrial capital detainee may be subjected to the administration of a
form of antipsychotic that increases the risk of exhibiting side effects during trial.
Defense counsel might discuss with the treating psychiatrist a possible change
in medication to prevent this from occurring. While the treating psychiatrist will
undoubtedly be aware of the existence of the newer antipsychotics, comm-
unication between counsel and the psychiatrist concerning the reasons why the
defendant is being administered one form of drug as opposed to another can
only benefit the defendant.
During the trial phase, it is critical that defense counsel keep a daily record
of the defendant's treatment. A capital defendant who experiences side effects
due to the involuntary administration of antipsychotics may suffer actual
prejudice to his defense during both the guilt phase and, more importantly,
sentencing. For example, the defense team may argue that the defendant, while
mentally ill and exhibiting violent tendencies before receiving the proper treat-
ment, no longer poses a danger to others as long as he is taking antipsychotic
medication. This defense strategy, however, could be impaired if the defendant
is outwardly exhibiting some of the more severe side effects of antipsychotics,
such as akathisia or tardive dyskinesia.213 A jury witnessing these noticeable
involuntary movements may question the defendant's ability to control his other
actions.214 At the least, a daily record of treatment may show changes in the type
or amount of antipsychotics that were administered during trial.
In a recent unpublished habeas decision by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, Baily v. True,21s the defendant claimed that his
counsel were ineffective in failing to inform the jury that his "emotionless"
appearance during trial and sentencing was due to the 900 milligrams of lithium
that were being administered to him each day.216 The defendant argued that his
counsel's failure "caused the jury to be misled into believing that he lacked
defendant's fair trial rights may be compromised by the side effects of antipsychotic medication).
212. See supra Part II.B. (discussing the potential side effects and cost of antipsychotic
medication).
213. See supra notes 34-39 and accompanying text (discussing the extrapyramidal side effects
of traditional antipsychotic drugs).
214. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.2 (Michie Supp. 2003) (stating that one of the two
statutory aggravating factors under Virginia law is a finding that "there is a probability that the
defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing serious threat
to society").
215. 100 Fed. Appx. 128 (4th Cir. 2004).
216. Bailey v. True, 100 Fed. Appx. 128, 132 (4th Cir. 2004).
2004]
CAPITAL DEFENSE JOURNAL
remorse for the murders he had committed., 21 7  The court rejected this
reasoning based on the Supreme Court of Virginia's factual finding that the trial
record "does not show that such dosage was administered on the days of trial or
that the medication caused the demeanor about which he complains. '218 It can
be inferred from Bailey, however, that if the record hadshown the drugs had been
administered and that the side effects about which he complained were a result
of the administration, the defendant may have had a valid ineffective assistance
of counsel claim based on his attorney's failure to inform the jury of the
treatment.219 It is essential, then, that defense counsel ensure that the jury is
informed as to the defendant's drug regimen during trial and the possible side
effects therefrom if the defendant is experiencing any changes in his demeanor
due to such administration.
It is also important for defense counsel to attempt to record the defendant's
actual appearance during trial. Counsel should monitor the defendant's behavior
during the proceedings and request that any behavior by the defendant that may
be prejudicial is entered into the trial record. The ideal method of preserving this
type of behavior for the record, of course, would be the court's permission to
videotape the defendant during trial. While it is not clear how this may be
practically accomplished, defense counsel should seek the advice of the court
prior to trial and agree on a specific method.
Monitoring is important not only during the trial stages, but during the
pretrial stages as well. During the pretrial stages, even immediately after the
defendant has been hospitalized for restoration, the treating psychiatrist will
attempt to diagnose the defendant's illness and will prescribe the administration
of a type of antipsychotic, if necessary. 22° This prescription, however, may not
have the intended immediate effect of restoration, and a higher dosage or new
type of drug may be prescribed. 221 The "trial-and-error" process that follows
may lead the psychiatrist to conclude that a specific type of drug is most effective
in alleviating the defendant's psychotic symptoms. It is important to remember,
however, that the side effects of antipsychotic medication can be prompted by
excessive dosages. 2  So, while the prescription may have alleviated the
symptoms of the defendant's psychosis, it may have also caused the defendant
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. But see Albrecht v. Horn, 314 F. Supp. 2d 451, 477-79 (E.D. Pa. 2004) (rejecting an
ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on defense counsel's failure to inform the jury of the
defendant's medicated state). In Albrecht, the defendant was voluntariby taking anti-depressants (not
antipsychotics) and was unable, in the court's opinion, to show that "the medications actually had
a significant, perceptible negative effect on his testimony." Id
220. See supra note 149 (setting forth the federal and Virginia standards for ordering the
restoration of competency through hospitalization).
221. JULIEN, supra note 7, at 502, 504.
222. Interview with Barbara G. Haskins, M.D., Forensic Psychiatrist, Western State Hospital,
in Staunton, Va. (Aug. 23, 2004).
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to experience prejudicial side effects. 2 3
During this process, defense counsel should independently educate
themselves as to the normal dosages of the specific medications prescribed for
their client. Armed with this knowledge, counsel will be able to recognize
prescribed dosages above the norm and can inquire as to the psychiatrist's
reasoning. Once again, open communication between counsel and the psych-
iatrist can be beneficial. A simple conversation regarding the reasons for a
specific dosage may lead to a decision to reduce the dosage, possibly alleviating
some of the more prejudicial effects of the drugs. If nothing more, such a
dialogue may apprise the psychiatrist of some of the side effects the defendant
may be experiencing but failing to report.
C. Using Documented Treatment During Capital Proceedings
Defense counsel may wish to present documented evidence of the
defendant's treatment for a number of reasons. First, evidence that the
defendant is under the influence of antipsychotics during the voir dire, guilt, and
sentencing phases can be instrumental in explaining to the jury why the
defendant may appear nervous, unconcerned, or even remorseless. 224 A
defendant's reactions to the proceedings may be an important factor in a given
juror's decision on both guilt and sentence.2 As mentioned above, a defendant
under the influence ofantipsychotics may experience side effects such as tremors
or other involuntary movements during his own or others' testimony.2 6 This
may appear to an unknowing juror as a sign of nervousness, thus putting the
credibility of the defendant into question 2 7 The presentation of evidence
concerning the defendant's treatment, and the potential side effects he may
experience during trial, may soften any prejudicial effect. Clearly, this provides
additional incentive for counsel to keep detailed records of the defendant's
treatment.
To give practical effect to this strategy, defense counsel should consult with
the court as to the method with which she can ensure the defendant's treatment
becomes part of the record. For example, counsel may ask whether the
223. See supra Part 1I.B. (discussing the various potential side effects of antipsychotic medica-
tion).
224. See smpra note 197 (discussing the role and importance of remorse in capital proceedings).
225. See Rggins, 504 U.S. at 144 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (noting that in capital cases
"assessments of character and remorse may carry great weight and, perhaps, be determinative of
whether the offender lives or dies").
226. See supra text accompanying notes 32-37 (discussing the potentially debilitating side
effects of antipsychotic medication).
227. See Rzgins, 504 U.S. at 142 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (noting that "the defendant's
behavior, manner, facial expressions, and emotional responses, or their absence, combine to make




administrator of the medication must appear in court at the start of the
proceedings each morning to testify that the defendant has in fact received the
medication. If not, it may suffice simply to read the defendant's daily treatment
into the record each morning. At the least, the custodian of the jail records may
be called to testify as to that morning's administration. In any event, a procedure
should be agreed upon prior to the start of trial to ensure efficiency, expediency,
and a clear and accurate record.
In addition to the preservation of the capital defendant's constitutionally
guaranteed trial rights, documentation of treatment can be instrumental in the
presentation of mitigating evidence.2-8  As stated earlier, the United States
Supreme Court has long recognized that a capital defendant is entitled to present
any relevant mitigating factor during the sentencing phase.29 A defendant's
mental condition is necessarily a relevant mitigating factor. 23 It follows that
evidence of a capital defendant's mental illness and the effects of treatment on
that defendant should be presented to the jury during the sentencing phase.
In Virginia, as in other capital sentencing jurisdictions, a medical expert can
be called upon to present evidence of the mental illness for which the defendant
is being treated." That expert may also be used to explain the symptoms of
psychosis and the defendant's inability to control his thought processes.- 3-
Testimony should also be presented as to the medication's effects on the
defendant's ability to express emotions during the sentencing phase. Finally, the
expert should be utilized to explain the effects of the treatment upon the
defendant's thought processes and the predictability of his behavior.233 Evidence
228. See Stephen P. Garvey, Aggravation and Mitigation in Capital Cases: What Do Jurors Think?,
98 COLUM. L. REV. 1538, 1564 (1998) (noting that "circumstances over which the defendant had
no control and that diminish his individual responsibility at the time of the offense are highly
mitigating"); John H. Blume & Pamela Blume Leonard, Capital Cases: Prindples of Developing and
Presenting MentalHealth Evidence in Cnminal Cases, THE CHAMPION, Nov. 2000, at 64 (recommending
that defense counsel gather and document all information pertaining to the defendant's mental
condition as mitigating evidence to be used at trial); John Blume, Mental Health Issues in Criminal
Cases: The Elements of a Competent and Reiable MentalHealth Examination, THEADVOCATE, Aug. 1995,
at 4-12 (describing processes for gathering and presenting evidence of a defendant's mental illness
at trial, induding in mitigation).
229. Edd'ngs, 455 U.S. at 113-15.
230. Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604 (plurality opinion) (including in the definition of a mitigating
factor "any aspect of a defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances of the of-
fense").
231. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.3:1 (A) (Michie Supp. 2003) (providing that a defendant
in a capital case is entitled to a qualified mental health expert "to assist the defense in the prepara-
tion and presentation of information concerning the defendant's history, character, or mental
condition, including... whether there are any... factors in mitigation relating to the history or
character of the defendant or the defendant's mental condition at the time of the offense").
232. See supra text accompanying notes 16-21 (explaining the effects of psychosis on the
patient's thought content and processes).
233. See E. FULLER TORREY, SURVIVING SCHIZOPHRENIA: A MANUAL FOR FAMILIES,
CONSUMERS AND PROVIDERS 175, 192 (3d ed. 1995) (noting that nearly seventy percent of
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of the capital defendant's treatment and results is directly relevant to, and can be
used to rebut, a charge of future dangerousness.
23
It might also be helpful for the expert to draw a comparison between the
defendant's erratic behavior before undergoing treatment and the defendant's
calmer demeanor once the treating psychiatrists discovered the optimal
combination of antipsychotics. To further this endeavor, counsel may consider
videotaping interviews with the defendant. A videotaped session during
counsel's early visits with the defendant may provide the jury with a vivid
contrast to the more composed individual before them in court. In any event,
it is evident that the more detailed the record of defendant's psychological
progression, whether on video or on paper, the more beneficial it will be for the
defendant during capital proceedings.
IV. Ethical Considerations
In both the civil and criminal arenas, it is the attorney's duty to do
everything within the law to obtain a resolution that she feels is in her client's
best interest.235 In a criminal case, a defense attorney's primary goal is to secure
a verdict or plea that exposes the client to the smallest punishment.236  In
practice, however, a client may have other interests that compete with this "legal
interest." For example, a client may accept a plea bargain rather than put his
family through the turmoil of a lengthy and publicized trial. Although the
attorney may feel there exists a strong possibility the client would receive a more
favorable verdict at trial, the client's "best" interests may be served by accepting
the plea offer.
A defense attorney who represents a capital defendant suffering from a
mental disease may find her client has competing medical interests of which the
client may not even be aware. For instance, the client may not acknowledge or
understand that the suicidal thoughts he experiences are due to a mental illness.
It is obviously in his best medical interest, however, to address his condition with
the proper medical treatment, via antipsychotics or otherwise. But, what should
his attorney do if that medicalinterest conflicts with the client's best legalinterest?
In light of the Supreme Court's decision in Sell, it may often be in the best
legal interest of a non-dangerous defendant to refuse the administration of
antipsychotics and thus force the state to find alternate means of rendering him
schizophrenic patients realize a clear improvement from the use of antipsychotic drugs).
234. See supra note 198 (explaining that "future dangerousness" is one of two aggravating
factors in Virginia, one of which must be found before a jury can sentence a defendant to death).
235. See VIRGINIA RULES OF POF' CONDUCT R. 1.2 (2000) ("A lawyer shall abide by a
client's decisions concerning the objectives of representation ... and shall consult with the client
as to the means by which they are to be pursued.").
236. Id In many capital murder cases, of course, the primary goal is to secure a sentence for
life in prison without the possibility of parole.
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competent to stand trial." The best course of legal action, then, would be for
defense counsel to instruct the defendant to refuse the antipsychotics, thus
protecting his fair trial rights. The defendant, however, may not want to refuse
the medication. He may understand that he has an illness and appreciate the fact
that there exists medication that will help alleviate his symptoms. 238  If the
defendant decides he wants to continue the administration of antipsychotics,
defense counsel should advise him of the possible repercussions of that decision,
including a recommendation that he speak with his psychiatrist concerning the
possible side effects of the drugs. Counsel should also advise the defendant of
his right to refuse the medication and the possible benefits of such a refusal
during trial.
V. Juy Instructions
Whether a capital defendant volunteers for or is ordered to undergo
treatment via antipsychotic medication during trial, it is imperative that the jury
is apprised of the possible side effects the defendant may be experiencing.
Because the jurors' impressions of the defendant, as formed through his
reactions to the proceedings, play a significant part in determining whether to
recommend life or death, it is important that they are reminded of his treatment
at all times.
Naturally, the first time the potential jurors will see the defendant is at voir
dire. 9 The judge will, after they are seated but before voir dire has begun,
address the venirepersons with a set of preliminary instructions regarding their
purpose for being present in the courtroom, the presumption of innocence, and
the burden of proof'24 A defense attorney should move the court, in limine, to
237. See Matthew Eisley, Lawyers Letting Client's Mental Illness Flourish, NEWS & OBSERVER
(Raleigh, NC), Feb. 14,2001, at Al (discussing Russell Weston's attorneys' legal and ethical decision
to refuse to let doctors treat him so long as the prosecution refused to waive the death penalty).
238. During his interview with Barbara G. Haskins, M.D. at Western State Hospital, the author
had the opportunity to meet with an accused who had just begun treatment with antipsychotics.
Interview with Barbara G. Haskins, M.D., Forensic Psychiatrist, Western State Hospital, in
Staunton, Va. (Aug. 23, 2004). The patient, who had upon being relocated to the hospital refused
to take the medication, now expressed his desire to "get better" and to take the medication. Id Dr.
Haskins explained that this was a common progression among patients experiencing delusional
episodes, and that it often takes time to convince the patient that the delusions are not real and that
the medication can assist them. Id.
239. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819 (1975) (holding that the Confrontation Clause
of the Sixth Amendment guarantees the right of a criminal defendant to be present at all critical
stages of the trial); United States v. Rolle, 204 F.3d 133, 137 (4th Cir. 2000) (noting that the
"defendant's presence at voir dire is of utmost importance").
240. See VA. SUP. CT. R. 1:21 (Michie 2003) ("At the outset of jury selection in any civil or
criminal case, the court shall deliver preliminary instructions that: (1) explain the purpose of the voir
dire examination, (2) explain the difference between peremptory challenges and removals for cause,
(3) summarize the nature of the case, (4) estimate how long the trial may last, and (5) indicate
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include at this point an instruction regarding the defendant's medicated state.-41
While the court will most likely decline to give an instruction regarding
specific side effects the defendant may be experiencing, it is important that the
venire and eventual jury be apprised of the fact that the defendant is under the
influence of medications that have the potential to induce visible side effects.
The instruction should remind the prospective jurors that any perception they
formulate of the defendant through the course of the proceedings should allow
for the fact that he is undergoing medical treatment. A sample pre-voir dire
instruction might read as follows:
I have been informed by the parties that the defendant, Mr./Ms.
-, is currently, and will probably be through the remainder
of the trial, under the influence of medication for an illness from
which he/she is currently suffering. I have also been informed that
these medications have been known to cause certain side effects.
Some of these medications can affect a person's ability to express
emotion or even cause that person to make involuntary movements.
Throughout the course of this trial you may form an opinion of
Mr./Ms. based on his/her conduct, expression,
statements, and reaction to testimony. I advise you, however, to keep
in mind that Mr./Ms. is under the influence of these
medications and may or may not be experiencing some of the side
effects I have mentioned. I have no personal feeling as to whether the
defendant is necessarily experiencing any of these side effects, but it
is important to keep in mind that he/she may at some point during
the trial.
In a perfect world, of course, counsel would prefer to have this or a similar
instruction given multiple times during capital proceedings: during the prelim-
inary instructions to the venire; during preliminary instructions to the empaneled
jury; during pre-deliberation instructions of the guilt/innocence phase; before
opening statements of the sentencing phase; and during pre-deliberation
instructions of the sentencing phase. Counsel should move the court to instruct
the venire/jury at each of these times, but should emphasize the importance of
instructing the jury during both sets of predeliberation instructions.
I. Conclusion
With the recent advances in antipsychotic pharmacology, the risk of
whether it is anticipated that the jury will be sequestered.'.
241. Counsel may also request the court to include the instruction by way of pretrial motion.
See VA. SUP. CT. R 3A:16(b) (Michie 2003) ("If directed by the court the parties shall submit
proposed instructions to the court at such reasonable time before or during the trial as the court
may specify and, whether or not proposed instructions have been submitted earlier, the parties may
submit proposed instructions at the conclusion of all the evidence.'.
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potentially debilitating side effects is now less severe. 4 2 A risk still exists,
however, that a capital defendant will experience some side effects while under the
influence of antipsychotic medication.2 4 3  For this reason, an attorney
representing a capital defendant in need of this form of medical treatment may
be faced with a number of legal and ethical issues. The right to refuse the
administration of antipsychotics has continued to evolve through United States
Supreme Court decisions, and mentally ill defendants' fair trial rights are
garnering greater protection.24 With this changing legal landscape comes an
opportunity for defense counsel to more adequately ensure a capital defendant's
constitutionally guaranteed right to a fair trial. The more knowledge a defense
attorney obtains regarding her client's specific condition and the methods being
used to treat him, the more effectively she can protect his interests, both legally
and medically. Therefore, it is increasingly important for an attorney to monitor
closely the medical decision-making process, even if only to maintain a level of
awareness as to her client's specific treatment.
In addition, the presentation of evidence concerning the defendant's
treatment during the various trial phases will protect the defendant against the
potentially prejudicial effects that the administration of antipsychotics may have
on the jury's perception of the defendant. It is equally critical that the jurors are
at all times aware of the defendant's treatment so as to ensure that their
impression of the defendant's culpability and potential for future dangerousness
is not distorted by the drugs' effects on his demeanor. The more a jury knows
about the capital defendant's current medical situation, the more fairly it can
assess his true culpability, character, and capacity for remorse. Even more
importantly, the more an attorney knows about the current treatment being
administered to her client, the more effectively she can prepare her client and his
defense.
242. See supra Part II.B. (discussing the potential side effects of antipsychotic medication).
243. Id
244. See supra Part III.A. (discussing Selland its effect on a pretrial detainee's right to refuse
medication).
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